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Law As Text: A Response to
Professor Michael Ryan
Robert N. Covington*
Law, Professor Michael Ryan reminds us by his emphasis on law as
legitimating representation, is also text. This is the most telling of the
many points he sets out in his provocative and thoughtful article; for
those of us called to the bar, it is an important reminder. For us law-
yers, after all, law is not so much text as it is process, not so much noun
as verb. It is not that we disregard the fact that law is in part a pen-
and-ink affair. Our shelves sag with books; in academic life, few divi-
sions of a university spend so great a portion of the budget on the li-
brary as does a law school. It is rare for lawyers, however, to read a
volume of a code from cover to cover, or a whole volume of reported
decisions, even of the United States Supreme Court. We seek out
paragraphs here and there, stumble over subsections, or ferret out help-
ful passages from opinions much as a carpenter rummages in the wood
box to find those bits and pieces that will make the new bookshelves
presentable. The text of law is for us tool or obstacle, a starting point
for our labor, not an end.
If we lawyers have a chief reason to be grateful to the law-and-
literature theorists, surely it is this: They remind us that for much of
society, including many of its most articulate and thoughtful members,
law is first and foremost text, a text with structure, tone, and syntax.
Thus, for those in society who must work with the law, legal text repre-
sents a part-arguably an indispensable part-of law's reality.
No doubt our failure as lawyers to think of law as a body of text
reflects that, while our skills are generalized, our interests become in-
creasingly particular after we pass the bar examination and apprentice
ourselves to become tax lawyers, or labor lawyers, or any one of many
specialists within the legal profession. As we thus narrow the focus of
our work we narrow also our use of the written law. We disregard most
of the available text, instead seeking out increasingly particularized sec-
tions of code, opinion, or regulation that conform to our theories of
what the law should be.
* Professor of Law, Vanderbilt University School of Law. B.A., Yale University, 1958; J.D.,
Vanderbilt University School of Law, 1961.
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Additionally, it may be true that those of us who are drawn to the
law have an uncommon tolerance for ambiguity and inconsistency in
text-so long as we still can use the text effectively. For example, the
principal lawyer-drafters at the Constitutional Convention of 1787
clearly recognized the irony of proclaiming in its preamble that the pur-
pose of our Constitution is to "secure the Blessings of Liberty to our-
selves and our Posterity,"' but providing elsewhere in the document for
the continuation of the slave trade.2
Our tunnel-vision approach to law as text may be appropriate to
our calling, but Professor Ryan does well to remind us that it separates
us from our fellows, and that we need on occasion to back away from
our specialist microscopes and view law as text in a broader and more
structural way. Looking at law in this manner may enable us to appreci-
ate more keenly the surprise and dismay many feel a quarter century
after the Equal Pay Act of 19631 and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964 proclaimed the day of equal treatment for women when re-
minded that the gender gap in take-home pay actually has narrowed
very little.5 For those who seriously view law as text, it is not wholly
unreasonable to read statutes with titles like "Equal Credit Opportu-
nity Act ' 6 or "Fair Packaging and Labeling Act"7 as implying a general
societal commitment to leveling the marketplace playing field. We are
warned fairly, then, by Professor Ryan that too much lawyerly toler-
ance for the loose use of text can lead to cynicism not only about
us-surely we can live with cynicism as easily as can literary critics and,
thus, may not find this worrisome-but also about the structure of law
as a whole.
One peculiar danger inherent in our failure to look at the general
corpus of law as text is our indifference to how overblown our text has
become. Some portions of legal text-the Internal Revenue Code,8 for
example-may have become so complex and unwieldy that they no
longer are understood broadly even by those who work with them daily.
Such a level of textual complexity may make an individual grappling
1. U.S. CONST. preamble.
2. See R. RUTLAND, JAMES MADISON 239-41 (1987); C. VAN DOREN, THE GREAT REHEARSAL 226
(1982). There was far less awareness, however, of the logical incongruity between proclamations of
the rights of the individual and the absence of political recognition of the rights of women. See S.
EVANS, BORN FOR LIBERTY 45-66 (1989).
3. 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (1988).
4. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-1 to 2000e-17 (1988).
5. A recent Bureau of Labor Statistics study calculated that full-time working women earned
72% of the pay men earned during the second quarter of 1990. U.S. Workers Still Losing Ground
to Inflation, BLS Report Says, Daily Labor Report (BNA) No. 146, at B-26 (July 30, 1990).
6. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1691-1691f (1988).
7. Id. §§ 1451-1461.
8. I.R.C. §§ 1-9602 (1990).
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with an administrative agency feel like a powerless character from a
Franz Kafka novel. "Due process" in such a situation provides little
comfort. Indeed, the idea of a helpless individual trapped in a maze of
administrative law may have prompted Professor Grant Gilmore to
state: "In Heaven there will be no law, and the lion will lie down with
the lamb. . . In Hell there will be nothing but law, and due process will
be meticulously observed." 9
Our gratitude to Professor Ryan for enjoining us to examine law as
text with a closer eye for both false promises and false premises, how-
ever, need not blind us to certain weaknesses in his case. Let us turn to
just one of these.
Professor Ryan understates the strength and continuing vitality of
the tradition of dissent in American literature and discourse. While at
times he takes care to aim his barbs only at what he characterizes as a
"dominant" tradition, at other times he couches his indictment in more
universal terms. To assert that the social-cultural-political representa-
tion found in the American press is one-voiced and inevitably pro-right
clearly is misleading. Coverage of the recent rapid changes in Eastern
Europe have evoked not just self-congratulatory editorials of the "we're
always right" sort, but also cartoons 0 and articles" which observe that
American politicians and business executives cheering on the demise of
Communist regimes in Eastern Europe might find themselves seriously
discomfited by the ideologies and practices emerging there.
Perhaps Bobby Weir of the Grateful Dead lies outside the range of
those who contribute to our political-cultural representation, in a nar-
row traditional sense, but certainly from Brendan Byrne Arena in the
Meadowlands to Henry Kaiser Stadium on the San Francisco Bay, he
has led tens of thousands to chant that when "pinstriped bosses roll the
dice / any way they fall guess who gets to pay the price / money green
from proletarian grey / selling guns instead of food that day."' 2
I would not dispute for a moment that many a novel, many a politi-
cian's speech, many a junior high civics text, and many a treatise have
presented the sort of representation Professor Ryan decries. Nor do the
advocates of totally unrestrained laissez faire give up easily or fade
from the scene. In the course of this past decade laissez-faire advocates
have demonstrated that they are as clever and ingenious as ever.
"Trickle down" became "supply side" in the twinkling of a conservative
9. As recounted in QUOTE IT II: A DICTIONARY OF MEMORABLE LEGAL QUOTATIONS 217 (E.
Gerhart ed. 1988).
10. See, for example, the cartoon by Michael Luckovich in NEWSWEEK, Mar. 12, 1990, at 17.
11. See, e.g., Greider, The Morning After, ROLLING STONE, Feb. 22, 1990, at 46, 51.
12. Bob Weir & John Barlow, "Throwing Stones" as recorded by the Grateful Dead, on In
The Dark (Arista Records 1987).
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eye. With amazing agility, those willing to let the state sidle its way into
the bedroom to censure the sexual practices of consenting adults" per-
suaded Congress that the state had no business sticking its nose into
the boardrooms of financial intermediaries. 14 "Deregulation" became
the banner cry of the day. We still are assessing the costs of deregulat-
ing the lending and interest-paying practices of our thrifts, with a price
tag now exceeding 150 billion dollars.' 5 How much of that debacle is to
be laid at the feet of the guileful among savings and loan executives,
and how much at the feet of the guileless, we cannot say yet and never
may be able to estimate. Clearly, however, it is an instance in which the
"interest of the larger group" of which Professor Ryan speaks-the
larger group being us taxpayers in this instance-was ill-protected by
our elective representatives, who were swept along on a torrent of free
enterprise rhetoric.
My criticism, then-if I fairly may use the term colloquially when
responding to a practitioner of criticism-is not that Professor Ryan
errs when he tells us that a variety of rogues have appropriated the
term "liberty" on occasion to mean the chance to get rich by grinding
others into the mud. Nor is he in error to say that there have been a
host of authors-some of them academics, some of them law-
yers-ready to prepare long-winded apologies for this appropriation of
the word, or for the disenfranchisement of women or minorities. My
difficulty is that Professor Ryan sketches out this usage so deftly that
we might be inclined to believe that the usage of "liberty" and "free-
dom" to mean laissez-faire capitalism has been universal, that the rob-
ber barons committed their thievery without detection or
condemnation, that white supremacists and male chauvinists have
reigned unchallenged.
One need not turn to rock lyrics or indeed to any of what might be
termed "pop culture" to find the contrary. Oft-reprinted works likely to
be found on many middle-class American bookshelves have presented
their readers with a less one-dimensional view. Certainly the superiority
of male character and resolve does not reveal itself to the reader of the
story of Hester Prynne;16 nor does James Fenimore Cooper depict Na-
13. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
14. See White, The Partial Deregulation of Banks and Other Depository Institutions, in
REGULATORY REFORM: WHAT REALLY HAPPENE11 169-209 (L. Weiss & M. Klass eds. 1986).
15. As of August 1990 sources estimated that the total cost of the savings and loan crisis
would exceed $500 billion and possibly reach the $1 trillion mark. Gorey & Hornick, No End in
Sight, TIME, Aug. 13, 1990, at 50.
16. See N. HAWTHORNE, THE SCARLET LETTER (1935). The struggle by women seeking politi-
cal representation did not occur on any organized basis until roughly 1850, but from that point on
the movement grew rapidly. See generally S. EVANS, supra note 2, at 93-143. As a labor lawyer, it is
interesting to note that economic strike activity preceded this political activism by several years.
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tive Americans as uniformly-or even typically-incompetent, insensi-
tive, or immoral as compared with their Anglo-American foes, even
when writing from a clearly Anglo perspective.17 Indeed, as Professor
Albert Keiser's 1933 survey showed, the portrayals of Native Americans
have varied substantially since the late eighteenth and early nineteenth
centuries.18 Nor has the American writer been all that kind to the capi-
talist. Whether novelist-like Frank Norris, the author of The Octo-
pus19-or journalist-Lincoln Steffens leaps to mind, of course ° -the
American writer has seen the business tycoon as something less than
heroic much of the time. Do not take the word, however, of a poorly
read lawyer. Try the delightful chapter in Professor Emily Stipes
Watts's The Businessman in American Literature entitled "The
Boobus Americanus and the Artist."'" The sort of stereotyping Profes-
sor Ryan suggests is more prevalent, admittedly, in the case of Afro-
Americans, particularly Afro-American women, but even in that in-
stance, a change in depiction had begun to emerge by the years follow-
ing the Second World War.2 Sympathetic portrayals of homosexuals,
he rightly implies, have been relatively rare.23
Formal dissent is, naturally, a long-honored practice in judicial
opinions; perhaps that is what makes an academic lawyer especially
conscious of dissenting traditions elsewhere. The dissenting opinion of
Justice John Harlan in Plessy v. Ferguson24 denouncing the concept of
See id. at 81-84.
17. See J.F. COOPER, LAST OF THE MOHICANS (1983).
18. A. KEISER, THE INDIAN IN AMERICAN LITERATURE (1933). One can, of course, quarrel with
some of Professor Keiser's readings, but that the portrait of this ethnic group is not uniformly one
of inferiority clearly is validated by the references he makes. For further reading, one might con-
sult the bibliography in K. LINCOLN, NATIVE AMERICAN RENAISSANCE 285 (1983).
19. F. NORRIS, THE OCTOPUS (1958).
20. See, e.g., L. STEFFENS, SHAME OF THE CITIES (1957).
21. E. WATTS, THE BUSINESSMAN IN AMERICAN LITERATURE 81 (1982). She begins another
chapter: "Most businessmen depicted in post-1945 television and serious literature are still charac-
terized as greedy, unethical, and immoral (or amoral) . . . ." Id. at 150.
22. See T. HARRIS, FROM MAMMIES TO MILITANTS 111-33 (1982).
23. It is arguable that positive portrayals of homosexuals are most likely to come from per-
sons of literary talent who themselves are homosexual and that these persons were unwilling to
write in this vein until recently. See generally S. ADAMS, THE HOMOSEXUAL As HERO IN CONTEMPO-
RARY FICTION (1980); R. AUSTEN, PLAYING THE GAME (1977). Austen's position is that not until Gore
Vidal's The City and the Pillar (1948) was there a major character in a major novel by a major
writer who was clearly and explicitly homosexual. R. AUSTEN, supra, at 118. Adams clearly agrees,
and opens his work with a treatment of Vidal. S. ADAMS, supra, at 15-34. French critic George-
Michel Sarotte suggests that American writers have a very difficult time accepting the notion that
truly virile men can form couples and instead depict the male homosexual relationship as involving
either a sadist or a highly feminine male. G. SARoTTE, LIrE A BROTHER, LIKE A LOVER 292-305
(1978).
24. 163 U.S. 537, 552-64 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting). It is interesting to note how contem-
porary some of the opinion seems, as when, for example, Justice Harlan asserts that all individuals
have "pride of race." Id. at 554 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
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"separate but equal" facilities is a famous example. This Symposium
opened examining the life of a Justice known as "The Great Dis-
senter." 5 There surely never has been a period when the importance of
dissent on the bench was as clear as the mid-1930s, the period when
laissez-faire economics seemed to have its strongest hold on the Ameri-
can legal system. Because the struggle over "freedom of contract" in
that era of Supreme Court jurisprudence has been well chronicled many
times,26 let me note a more homespun illustration from Tennessee law.
Payne v. Western & Atlantic R.R.27 is an oft-cited 1884 case credited
with establishing the doctrine of employment at will. The employment
at will point actually is developed far more extensively in the majority
opinion than was necessary. I have asserted elsewhere28 that the reason
for the frequent citation of the opinion was the vigor of its language:
"The great and rich and powerful are guaranteed the same liberty and
privilege as the poor and weak. All may buy and sell when they choose
.... -29 What often is overlooked is that Payne was decided by a single
vote, three to two. In the dissent, Judge Thomas Freeman wrote:
In view of the immense development and large aggregations of capital in this fa-
vored country-a capital to be developed and aggregated within the life of the pre-
sent generation more than a hundred fold-giving the command of immense
numbers of employes [sic] . . . it is the demand of a sound public policy, for the
future more especially, as well as now, that the use of this power should be re-
strained within legitimate boundaries.30
In law, then, as in literature, the tradition of dissent, of skepticism
about all the promises and premises of laissez faire, of caution about its
social, economic, and political impact is an honored tradition. Dissent,
too, is part of the sociocultural "representation" that is the background
fabric of much of legal thought.
My two final comments must be made much more succinctly. One
is essentially an invitation, not to Professor Ryan alone, but to others
engaged in the same sort of analysis, to consider the implications of
that analysis for private law, particularly the law of contracts. Individu-
als as well as entities surrender goods and services on a regular basis in
25. See White, HOLMES As CORRESPONDENT, 43 VAND. L. REV. 1707 (1990) (referring to Oliver
Wendell Holmes).
26. See, e.g., CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: ANALYSIS AND INTERPRETATION
976-80 (E. Corwin rev. ed. 1953).
27. 81 Tenn. 507 (1884).
28. See Covington, Employment at Will in Tennessee: Expect Reasonable Changes, 17
MEM. ST. UL. REv. 363, 365 (1987).
29. Payne, 81 Tenn. at 519.
30. Id. at 542-43 (Freeman, J., joined by Turney, J., dissenting). It would be unfair, however,
to list these opinions without noting that the refusal of the Supreme Court to find that denying a
woman admission to the bar of a state did not constitute a violation of the Constitution occurred
with only a single dissenting vote and no written opinion.
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our society in exchange for the words of promises. A substantial theo-
retical discussion has developed in recent years about whether we ought
to enforce contracts because they are promises, or whether we ought to
enforce contracts because it is socially useful to do so in some circum-
stances.3' Some of Professor Ryan's comments about the abuse of eco-
nomic power suggest that those who share his framework might have
things to say about these private law matters as well as the public law
issues he has addressed today.
Finally, a word about Professor Ryan's suggestion of a possible so-
lution to the perceived problem of political impotence on the part of
ethnic minorities and women: election districts in which all voters
would be women, or Polish-Americans, or WASPs. Political subdivi-
sions based on race, sex, or ethnicity, as opposed to geography, are not a
totally new idea. The Voting Rights Act of 19652 provides for the
redrawing of political district election lines to give previously disadvan-
taged racial minorities a more potent voice at the ballot box. In 1982
Congress amended the original statute to broaden the availability of
this remedy to those cases in which the use of a given election district
system resulted in a discriminatory impact upon racial minorities, not
just in cases in which a discriminatory impact actually was intended.3
During the development of these amendments, Senator John East, a
North Carolina Republican, suggested the addition of gender discrimi-
nation and religious discrimination as acts prohibited by the statute. 4
His proposal was rejected, however, and gender and religion remain un-
protected classes under current voting rights law.
It is possible to argue that the Senator's proposal really was not
intended to advance the causes of women's rights or religious freedom.
Senator East was unenthusiastic about the underlying legislation, and
his colleagues possibly rejected the amendment simply because it was
not put forward with zeal or conviction.3 5 Before dismissing the rejec-
tion of those proposals as totally accounted for on that ad hominem
basis, however, one should recall that gender discrimination was added
31. This gross oversimplification is clearly the Author's awkward and inadequate effort to
give at least a sense of the positions of Professors Charles Fried and Grant Gilmore, respectively.
They certainly are much better presenters of their own views. See C. FRIED, CONTRACT As PROMISE
(1981); G. GILMORE, THE DEATH OF CONTRACT (1974).
32. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1973 to 1973dd-6 (1988).
33. Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-205, 96 Stat. 131 (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1973).
34. S. REP. No. 417, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 4, reprinted in 1982 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.
NEws 177, 180-81.
35. See the separate remarks of Senator East. Id. at 201, reprinted in 1982 U.S. CODE CONG.
& ADMIN. NEWS at 370.
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at the last minute to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 19646 when
proposed by conservative Democrat Congressman Howard Smith, who
also lacked enthusiasm for the underlying bill, in an apparent effort to
defeat the legislation.
The rejection of the proposed amendment to the Voting Rights Act
by a majority that included several well-known advocates of equal
rights legislation"1 in my view was well advised. Proposals such as this
raise logistical and administrative difficulties of an ideologically painful
sort, such as how many electorates to create. For example, what of a
separate district for Irish-American Catholic women over forty? As soon
as one urges that we ought not to submerge the identity of "female-
ness" by representing that female in Congress through a male, it be-
comes difficult indeed to identify what other aspects of the complex
factors that make up each of our personal identities should be protected
as well. Should there be a district for the unemployed? If so, should
that be subdivided by length of unemployment? By skills? By whether
the unemployment is caused by import competition? Dividing the elec-
torate by certain defined characteristics can contribute also to the de-
velopment of more and more single-issue politicians. This, in turn, can
be expected to lead to a marked increase in the level of dissonance in
public debate and discussion.
We Americans already live with a level of vigorous dissonance in
our public discussion that is greater than that in much of the world.
How much more can be tolerated? Obviously, none of us can know, but
probably a bit more than at present. The political system at the federal
level does not seem to show signs of collapse just yet. But can we toler-
ate the level of dissonance required to live with the fragmentation envi-
sioned by Professor Ryan's proposal?
Professor Ryan would argue that I make too much of the impor-
tance of the perception of dissonance and disorder in governance. We
meet today under the banner of "Law AND Literature." "Law" is a
term that seems to invite use with conjunctives. Courses on "Law and
Economics," "Law and Sociology," and "Law and the Status of
Women" have sprung up in many curricula. Over the years "law" has
been juxtaposed with three other terms with uncommon frequency:
"Law and Justice," "Law and Liberty," and "Law and Order." Men and
women of all sorts and conditions, of all races and creeds, have labored
and even fought and died in the name of all of these. My own reading
36. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-1 to 2000e-17 (1988).
37. Senators Joseph Biden, Edward Kennedy, and Howard Metzenbaum, for example, op-
posed both amendments. S. REP. No. 417, supra note 34, at 77-78, reprinted in 1982 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS at 256-57.
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of history is that of the three, it is the last of these-law and or-
der-that exacts the highest price from the human spirit, but it is also
law and order for which most of us are willing to pay the highest price.
The perception that government is not governing justly may give rise to
unrest and change; the perception that government is not governing at
all is certain to bring change-and the likelihood is that the change
may be one that forfeits both justice and liberty for order. It is a sober-
ing concern.

